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In China industrial clusters consisting of small and medium enterprises have been 
proliferating in areas where private sectors have successfully developed.  This study 
inquires into the process of forming a new industrial cluster in the garment industry in 
China.  We found that the local marketplace, where enterprise managers can easily 
purchase materials from and sell products to local traders, plays a critical role in 
stimulating the entry of new enterprises in the early stage of cluster development.  As a 
cluster develops, however, entrepreneurial ability in producing improved products and 
marketing them to urban traders plays a more significant role. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
It has been increasingly recognized that industrial clusters play a significant role in 
industrial development, not only by economists interested in the economic geography of 
industrialization but also by development economists [Henderson, 1988; Krugman, 
1991; Hayami, 1998; World Bank, 2000].  Industrial clusters in developing countries 
tend to be formed by small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) [Schmitz, 1995a; 
Schmitz and Nadvi, 1999].  Humphrey and Schmitz [1996, p. 1859] argue that SMEs 
“become one of the main targets of policies aimed at creating growth and employment 
in developing countries.” 
What are the major factors affecting the competitiveness of industrial clusters 
consisting of SMEs?  According to Marshall [1920], industrial clusters have three 
major advantages: (1) information spillovers among enterprises; (2) the division and 
specialization of labor among enterprises; and (3) the formation of skilled labor markets.  
Thus, enterprises located in the industrial cluster can easily imitate new technology 
developed by other enterprises, purchase (or sell) parts and intermediate products from 
(or to) other enterprises, and hire workers with required skills.  We expect that the 
relative importance of these three advantages will change in the process of cluster 
development.  For example, information spillovers will be particularly important when 
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new technologies are actively developed in the early stage of cluster development, 
whereas access to skilled labor will become important in the later stage of cluster 
development when high-quality products are produced.  Yet, the existing econometric 
studies on the geography of industrialization generally analyze the role of industrial 
clusters or agglomeration in employment growth for a given time period using 
cross-sectional data [Glaeser et al., 1992; Henderson et al., 1992].  In order to obtain a 
proper understanding of the role of industrial clusters, the dynamic process of cluster 
formation and subsequent development must be explored in depth. 
It is interesting to observe that industrial clusters have rapidly been formed in 
various places in the Zhejiang province of China, where private enterprises have 
mushroomed in the last two decades [Zhang, 1999; Tang and Cheng, 2000].1  Such a 
phenomenon provides rare opportunities for economists to trace the process of the  
development of industrial clusters and to identify the factors affecting the advantages of 
industrial clusters.  Yet, to our knowledge, no rigorous empirical study on the 
development of industrial clusters in China has been attempted. 
This study reports the results of our own case study of small, privately owned 
garment enterprises in Jili town in the Zhejiang province of China, which is located 140 
km southwest of Shanghai.2  Major products used to be low-quality garment products 
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for children, which are relatively simple and homogeneous.  In the early stage of 
cluster development, the marketplace was established by the township government, 
where producers purchased standard parts from and sold their simple products to local 
traders.  At this stage of cluster development, price competition among enterprises was 
intense.  In the 1990s, however, leading enterprises began to upgrade the quality of 
their products and, hence, the quality competition intensified.  This quality 
improvement partly represents a response to the increased demand for high-quality 
garment products in the domestic markets of China associated with the rapidly rising 
income levels.   
An important question is how the industrial cluster achieved the quality 
improvement.  It is found in the cluster literature that vertical cooperation through the 
specialization and division of labor among enterprises is strengthened when the quality 
of products, as well as speed and flexibility of production, is improved [e.g., Schmitz 
2000].  In the case of Jili, such vertical inter-enterprise cooperation has developed only 
gradually between garment enterprises and embroiderers as well as supportive service 
industries, such as printing, machinery repairing, packing, and shipping.  More 
importantly, close cooperation between local manufacturing enterprises and urban 
traders has developed.  According to Humphrey and Schmitz [1996], the establishment 
 4 
of marketing channels capable of responding to changes in the outside market is 
important in the cluster development.  Knorringa [1999] points out that outside traders 
are the prime source of demand information for producers in the cluster.  Furthermore, 
the role of global buyers in the upgrading of manufacturers in the cluster is hotly 
debated in the recent literature on industrial cluster [Schmitz and Knorringa, 2000; 
Humphrey and Schmitz, 2000].  Thus, it will be of utmost interest to explore how the 
structure of the garment cluster in China interacted with the emergence of marketing 
opportunities brought about by outside traders.  A major new finding of this study is 
that local entrepreneurs, who had previously been local traders or engaged in marketing 
activities, have superior abilities to produce and sell higher-quality products directly to 
urban traders.  This finding suggests that industrial clusters that have internal capacity 
to respond to outside market opportunities tend to grow well.     
The major purpose of this study is to trace the process of the formation of an 
industrial cluster with special focus on the role of traders, using the survey data of 98 
garment enterprises in Jili.  The organization of this article is as follows.  Section II 
specifies empirically testable hypotheses, while Section III describes changing 
characteristics of our sample enterprises.  Section IV estimates regression functions 
explaining the performance of enterprises in terms of the proportion of direct marketing 
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to outside traders, the quality of the product, and value added per worker.  Finally, we 
summarize our major findings and implications for future studies in Section V. 
 
II.  TESTABLE HYPOTHESES 
Jili was a poor rural town endowed with meager arable land.  The name of the 
town literally means “weaving village,” as Huzhou city to which this village belongs 
produced woven silk products in the distant past [Ji, 1998].  In the 1970s, local traders 
of Jili traveled throughout China to sell simple hand-made products, such as pillowcases 
and bedspreads, produced by female members of farm households.  It is these traders 
who introduced the new business of producing children’s clothes to Jili around 1980.  
In the early 1980s, many people in the locality began producing new products, and the 
town became famous, first in the large market in Beijing in the early 1990s and later in 
other urban markets as well, for the production of children’s clothing with embroidery.  
To use the term of Ranis and Stewart [1993], “Z-goods” were replaced by “modern 
Z-goods.”  According to the local government office of Jili township, there are about 
5,000 garment enterprises exclusively producing garments for children in this town as 
of 1999.   
How to procure required materials and sell products is always a major problem 
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for a new industrial cluster formed in rural areas.  Jili is no exception; moreover, given 
the suppressed marketing sectors under the socialist system, marketing was a critical 
bottleneck for the development of the garment industry in this town.  A major 
innovation to overcome this constraint was the establishment of a marketplace for 
garment products and materials in 1983 by the township government, which replaced 
roadside vending.  In the marketplace, manufacturers could easily purchase all the 
necessary materials, including cloth, thread, buttons, and zippers, and sell their finished 
products on commission to local traders, who, in turn, sold those products to traders 
coming from other regions.  It is important to emphasize that anonymous transactions 
through marketplaces are efficient when standard and homogeneous products are 
produced using standard materials.  The number of marketplaces increased over time 
and reached eight in 2000, when our survey was conducted.  Local traders also went to 
other areas to sell garment products, but they were successful primarily in poor rural 
areas as they did not possess relevant market information in more affluent urban areas.  
There is no question that the establishment of the marketplace by the local 
government facilitated the emergence and subsequent development of the garment 
cluster.  This is interesting, because in the case of European clusters, the emergence of 
the industrial districts did not result from a consciously pursued local or regional 
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industrial strategy [Humphrey and Schmitz, 1996].  In our view, the government 
decision in Jili intended to foster the cluster development, as many specialized 
marketplaces had already been established in a large number of burgeoning clusters in 
Zhejiang province, where small private enterprises prospered.  It seems to us that the 
importance of the marketplace in facilitating the development of clusters was common 
knowledge in this province in the early 1980s.  
Since the establishment of marketplaces significantly reduced the entry barrier to 
this industry, even inexperienced people in the garment business, including farmers, 
could enter the industry and, hence, garment production was diffused from the center of 
the town to its suburbs.  The low barriers to entry, however, led to “excessive” entry, 
which eroded the profitability of producing standard products.  This seems to have 
induced garment enterprises to improve the quality of their products.  As the theory of 
contracts implies, the upgrading of product quality would have an impact on the mode 
of transaction [Klein and Leffler, 1981].  
According to our informal interviews, the upgrading of the products tends to be 
faster at garment enterprises where managers have production experience, including the 
experience of producing low-quality products, and intense interactions with other 
enterprise managers.  With product quality being upgraded, anonymous market 
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transactions are no longer efficient, because visual inspection alone cannot be relied 
upon to check the quality of sophisticated products.  Instead, face-to-face and 
long-term direct transactions between local manufacturers and traders coming from 
urban areas have developed, which aim to guarantee the on-time delivery of products 
free from defects.  As in other industrial clusters, the extended trust was created 
between the local enterprise managers and the urban traders [Humphrey and Schmitz, 
1998].  Those enterprises producing higher-quality products generally operate not only 
factories but also wholesale garment shops facing main streets in the center of the 
town.3  Thus, we postulate the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: The importance of transactions through local traders and marketplaces 
declines, while that of direct transactions with outside traders increases over time, as 
the product quality improves. 
It is interesting to ask what the role of the industrial cluster is in the transition 
from anonymous market transactions to direct transactions with outside traders.  In this 
transition process, garment enterprises producing higher-quality products actively 
sought outside traders, who are primarily urban wholesalers coming from large cities, 
such as Shanghai and Beijing.  Urban traders also looked for local garment enterprises 
that can produce high-quality products.  These urban traders bring information about 
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urban demand to the locality, but as in the case of global buyers, they do not seem to 
contribute to the upgrading of the design and marketing capacity in the cluster [Schmitz 
and Knorringa, 2000; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2000].  In our observation, an important 
role of industrial clusters is to make scarce information on urban markets available to a 
large number of enterprises in the cluster.  Search costs would be especially low in the 
central location where enterprise managers and outside traders can easily meet.  
Therefore, it seems reasonable to postulate the following hypothesis:   
Hypothesis 2: The locational advantage of the central location is pronounced in the 
quality-upgrading stage of development, when the direct transaction with outside 
traders assumes greater importance.  
Schumpeter [1912] argues that a manager who commences a new business, 
introduces new products and production methods, and develops new markets plays the 
role of an entrepreneur, who earns sizeable profits in the beginning and who is 
subsequently followed by imitators.  While it is unclear exactly who initiated the new 
garment business and earned the Schumpeterian profit in the early stage of cluster 
development in Jili, it is clear that the establishment of marketplaces enabled 
inexperienced people to become followers by facilitating transactions of materials and 
finished products.  In the qualitative-upgrading stage, where direct transactions with 
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outside traders became important, both technical and marketing expertise seem to have 
become critically important.4  In fact, the transition into this stage entailed another 
wave of innovations, and as such the reward for the useful expertise must be considered 
as entrepreneurial profits in the sense of Schumpeter.  Thus, the following hypothesis 
is worth testing: 
Hypothesis 3: Those entrepreneurs who are adept at factory production and marketing 
are more successful than other entrepreneurs in the quality-upgrading stage.   
 
III.  CHARACTERIZATION OF SAMPLE ENTERPRISES 
     We conducted a random survey of 120 enterprises in the greater Jili area in the 
summer of 2000.  In accordance with the actual geographical distribution of garment 
enterprises in the area, 60% of the sample enterprises were selected randomly from the 
township of Jili and the rest from four nearby villages, which were also selected 
randomly.  After the survey, we eliminated 18 enterprises because their production and 
cost data were either incomplete or highly suspicious, and another four enterprises 
because they had operated for less than one year at the time of our survey.  Thus, the 
sample actually used in the analysis consists of 98 enterprises.   
In order to identify the changing characteristics of the garment cluster in Jili, we 
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collected recall data on changes in (1) the relative importance of different marketing 
channels, (2) the quality indicators of products, such as product price, by marketing 
channel, and (3) enterprise performance by location of enterprises and the previous 
occupation of enterprise managers in the 1990s.  Since such statistical data are seldom 
provided by cluster studies, their careful examination is expected to shed new light on 
the development of industrial clusters. 
     
General Characteristics 
As is clearly shown in Table 1, the number of enterprises increased over time, as 
many of our sample enterprises entered the industry in the 1990s.  It is also clear that 
the average size of enterprises, in terms of the quantity of production and the number of 
workers, gradually increased during the same period.  However, it remained relatively 
small even in 1999; on the average, only 17 workers were employed per enterprise in 
this year.5  This indicates that there are no significant scale economies in the garment 
production in Jili.  Indeed, each worker produces products individually using relatively 
simple sewing machines without any division and specialization of labor among 
workers within an enterprise, with the possible exceptions of finishing processes using 
specialized sewing machines and the embroidery process for which the service of 
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specialized manufacturers using high-tech machines is available.   
Both nominal product price and nominal value added per piece of product 
increased slightly from 1990 to 1995 and then declined to 1999.  The price index of 
garment products in China as a whole increased by 8.5% from 1990 to 1995 but 
declined by 15% from 1995 to 1999 [State Statistical Bureau, 2000].  The prices of Jili 
products rose slightly relative to the national average in this decade.  This is likely due 
to the successful shift from the production of lower quality products to higher quality 
products that Jili enterprises achieved during this period. 
     Low quality products were primarily shipped to poor rural areas in China and 
Russia through local traders and traders coming from northern regions, such as 
Xingjang.  According to our interviews with local traders, the size of the market for 
such low-quality products was limited.  Even in markets for higher quality products, 
competition among enterprises in Jili and elsewhere increased over time.  
Consequently, average value added per enterprise increased only slightly from 1995 to 
1999.  On the other hand, wage earnings per hour under piece rate contracts increased 
steadily, resulting in continued increases in the factor share of labor in value added.  
We gathered information from a large number of producers through interviews that they 
have been losing profits due to increased competition.  Of the 120 enterprises that we 
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interviewed, 16 enterprises suffered from deficits in 1999, whereas no enterprises and a 
small number of enterprises reported deficits in 1990 and 1995, respectively.6   
 
Marketing Channels 
Table 2 exhibits the proportions of products sold through local marketplaces, 
direct transactions with outside traders, and local traders and others.  It is clear from 
this table that the proportion of direct transactions rapidly increased at the sacrifice of 
marketing through local traders as well as local marketplaces.7  Some local traders 
became managers or were employed as marketing specialists in successful garment 
enterprises.  These changes are consistent with Hypothesis 1. 
In order to identify the differences in the quality of products transacted through 
different marketing channels, it is instructive to compare product prices, material cost or 
value added per piece of product by marketing channel.  It was, however, difficult to 
obtain such data from enterprises using multiple marketing channels.  Table 3 shows 
the average producer price of products, material cost and value added per piece, by 
major marketing channel, using the data of enterprises exclusively using only one 
marketing channel.8  It is clear that the average price, material cost and value added 
per piece of the products transacted at the local marketplace have been consistently and 
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significantly lower than those directly transacted with outside traders.9  These findings 
imply that the lower-quality products were transacted at local marketplaces, which 
provides added support to Hypothesis 1.  Similar findings are reported by Knorringa’s 
[1999] study of the shoe cluster in India.  
Another important finding is that the average price at local marketplaces declined 
more sharply from 1995 to 1999, indicating that more intense competition among 
producers selling products at marketplaces has taken place.  This is expected, since the 
entry to the lower-quality segment of this industry must have been relatively easy. 
 
Increasing Locational Advantage of the Central Location 
The marketplace was originally built near the center of the township, but as the 
volume of transactions in the marketplace increased rapidly, new buildings of 
marketplaces were constructed one after another, shifting the center of transactions 
toward the south.  The sample enterprises in the township and two neighboring 
villages are, on average, 3.7 km and 1.6 km away from the current center of the 
marketplace, respectively.  On the other hand, sample enterprises in the two northern 
remote villages are, on average, as far as 11.5 km away.  Table 4 compares the 
performances of 28 enterprises in the northern villages with those of the other sample 
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enterprises in the town and its neighboring villages.  This urban vs. rural location issue 
has not been covered in the existing literature.   
Several interesting observations can be made.  First, the share of direct 
transactions with outside traders was far higher for enterprises located near the 
marketplace than for those in the remote villages, and the difference increased rapidly 
over time.  Second, consistent with the first finding, both material cost and value added 
per piece were significantly higher for enterprises located near the marketplace, which 
confirms the hypothesis that products transacted directly with outside traders are of 
higher quality.  These findings clearly indicate that the central locations have 
advantages in transactions of high quality products with urban traders.  Third, 
enterprises located near the marketplace were much larger in terms of the number of 
employees.  The proportion of migrant workers, who were primarily young female 
workers coming from poor rural areas, was also higher in the center, which is consistent 
with Marshall’s argument of locational advantages.  The remote villages, however, 
caught up with the center rapidly in the employment of migrants, especially in the early 
1990s.  This is likely to reflect the development of an integrated labor market, which 
reduces the disadvantage of peripheral areas.  Nonetheless, other findings indicate that 
the overall disadvantages in peripheral areas increased.  Fourth, judging from the 
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average hourly earnings, the quality of workers seems higher in the center.  Fifth, 
capital-labor ratio was also higher in the center in 1999, reflecting, at least partly, the 
higher hourly wage earnings of workers in the center.  Note that in our analysis, capital 
stock is measured by the replacement value of equipment such as sewing machines, 
cutters, and electric irons.  The replacement value was obtained by ascertaining the 
secondhand price of each item of equipment from the enterprise manager.  For fear of 
serious recall errors, we attempted to obtain capital data only for the latest year of 1999, 
but not for 1990 and 1995.10  Finally, consistent with the higher capital-labor ratio in 
the township and the neighboring villages, average labor productivity was also higher 
there.  These observations are consistent with Hypothesis 2 on the advantage of a 
central location.  
 
Changing Characteristics of Entrepreneurs 
In order to examine broadly the validity of Hypothesis 3 about the changing 
characteristics of enterprise managers, Table 5 shows the timing of new entry to the 
garment industry by previous occupation of enterprise managers, and their changing 
levels of schooling and technical expertise.  In the existing literature on industrial 
clusters, the possible importance of managers’ previous occupations is not examined.  
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It is found that the major former occupation of founders of enterprises in the 1980s was 
farming.  Their relative importance, however, declined over time, suggesting that prior 
knowledge on garment production and marketing was not required in the entry to the 
garment business in the early stage of cluster development.  The share of former 
factory workers, the majority of whom were spin-offs from the local garment factories, 
increased in the early 1990s, but then declined in the late 1990s.  Consistently 
increasing was the share of former garment traders and marketing specialists employed 
by garment enterprises.  These new entrepreneurs tend to be more educated and had 
acquired sewing skills before starting their businesses more frequently than the earlier 
entrepreneurs, as is suggested by the increasing average schooling and share of new 
entrants with sewing and related skills.  In fact, the ex-farmers had on average only 6.6 
years of schooling and almost none of them had sewing skills or working experience in 
sewing factories.  Thus, the observations from Table 5 are consistent with Hypothesis 3 
that the importance of knowledge on production and marketing increased over time as 
the quality competition intensified.   
Table 6 compares changes in the performance of the garment enterprises by 
former occupation of managers.  Former marketing specialists performed best, selling 
most of their products directly to outside traders, producing products with higher value 
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added, employing a larger and increasing number of employees, adopting the most 
capital-intensive production methods, and achieving the highest labor productivity.  It 
is also noteworthy that despite the adoption of relatively labor-intensive production 
method indicated by low capital-labor ratio, managers who used to be factory workers 
achieved relatively high labor productivity, which suggests that their technical expertise 
facilitated more efficient factory operations than other managers.  Since most workers 
specialize in sewing at all factories in Jili and receive on-the-job training from managers 
or senior engineers, such a productivity gain can be attributed to the effect of such 
training.11    
 
IV.  REGRESSION ANALYSES  
     In this section, we conduct regression analyses to test our empirical hypotheses 
rigorously.  Taking into account the fact that garments produced by the sample 
enterprises range from low- to high-quality products, we consider the following 
value-added production function: 
  V = (p – m)q = vAf(K, L, ),     (1) 
where V is value added; v is average value added per piece of product expressed by 
product price (p) minus unit material cost (m); and q is the number of manufactured 
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garment products, which depends not only on capital (K) and labor (L) inputs but also 
on the production efficiency (A) and the simplicity of the production ().12  We 
assume that q depends on , because the simpler the product and production processes 
are, the larger the number of clothes that can be produced.  As a proxy for , we use 
the inverse of material cost per piece (1/m) since a more complicated product tends to 
require a larger amount of higher-quality materials.  From the descriptive tables 
examined in the previous section, it seems innocuous to assume that the production 
technology exhibits constant returns to scale.  If the value-added function shown in 
equation (1) can be approximated by the Cobb-Douglas form, we may rewrite it as 
 ln(V/L) = ln(v) + ln(A) + 1ln(m) + 2ln(K/L),     (2) 
where the coefficient of ln(v) is unity, 1 is expected to be negative, and 2 corresponds 
to the production elasticity with respect to capital.  Note that v and m are endogenous 
variables and, hence, we apply the two-stage estimation technique.  Since the 
coefficient of ln(v) is expected to be unity, we also estimated the production function, f, 
after eliminating the ln(v) term.  It must also be noticed that v and m are expected to be 
determined simultaneously, so that the same reduced-form equations are applied to the 
first-stage estimation of v and m determination functions.   
     According to Hypothesis 1, high-quality products, which are characterized by 
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higher values of v and m, tend to be sold directly to outside traders more often than 
lower-quality products.  Thus, in order to test the validity of Hypothesis 1, we apply 
the same reduced-form equations to the estimation of the determinants of the proportion 
of direct transactions, v, and m.  We expect that if Hypothesis 1 is valid, factors 
affecting the proportion of direct transactions tend to be the same as those affecting v 
and m, particularly in 1999.  
     Relevant exogenous variables to be considered are classified into three categories: 
the characteristics of enterprises, enterprise managers, and workers.  To represent the 
location of enterprises, we use two dummy variables (representing remote and 
neighboring villages) and the road distance between the enterprise and the center of the 
local marketplaces (distance).  Although the village dummies may capture most of the 
effect of location, distance will represent the effect of within-township and 
within-village variations of distance.13  We expect that the shorter the distance is, the 
higher the proportion of direct transactions, material cost per piece, and value added per 
piece will be.   
     As was suggested in the previous sections, the major characteristics of enterprise 
managers may be captured by previous occupation, years of schooling, and skill dummy 
that is equal to 1 if the enterprise manager has sewing and related skills, and 0 otherwise.  
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To examine the effects of previous occupation, we use dummy variables for a former 
farmer, factory worker, and marketing specialist, setting the group of other specialists 
and managers as default.  We expect that the effects of marketing specialist dummy and 
skill dummy are strengthened over time as the importance of product quality increases.     
     Finally, the characteristics of labor force may be captured by average years of 
schooling of workers and invited technician dummy which equals 1 if the enterprise 
invited one or more technicians in the initial year of operation and 0 otherwise.  These 
variables are expected to have positive effects on v, m, and the incidence of direct 
transactions. 
     Let Xi denote the vector of the variables representing these characteristics of 
enterprise i.  We regress the three dependent variables on Xi for 1995 and 1999 
separately, because the coefficients are expected to change over time.14  We employed 
the two-limit tobit model for the direct transaction ratio since its data are censored at 0 
and 1.  The results are reported in Table 7. 
     Judging from the estimated coefficients of village dummies in the first two 
columns, the advantage of the central location in directly transacting with outside 
traders increased from 1995 to 1999, which supports Hypothesis 2.  Somewhat 
unexpectedly, however, distance is generally insignificant, which may be taken to imply 
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that within township and village variations in distance are not critically important in 
determining locational advantages.  The effect of years of schooling of manager on the 
direct transaction ratio is positive and significant in both 1995 and 1999, which suggests 
that general human capital is important in marketing.  This is reasonable in view of the 
fact that marketing is a knowledge intensive activity requiring the abilities to collect and 
decode changing market information.  Although unreported here, schooling of 
managers is not significant in the estimation of the production function when ln(v) is 
included as an explanatory variable, which suggests that schooling does not affect 
internal organizational efficiency nor the efficiency of cooperation with other 
enterprises.  From these columns, it is also clear that the coefficient of years of 
operation decreased over time, whereas the opposite is the case for marketing specialist 
and skill dummies.  These findings indicate the increasing importance of marketing and 
technical expertise in recent years, which is consistent with Hypothesis 3, so far as 
direct marketing to outside traders leads to higher profits.  The finding that the former 
marketing specialists performed better is consistent with the common finding in the 
cluster literature that marketing or cooperation in forward ties becomes important in the 
upgrading stage of cluster development [Knorringa, 1999; Nadvi, 1999; Rabellotti, 
1999; Schmitz, 1999]. 
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     Qualitatively, the estimation results of the direct transaction ratio functions are not 
so different from those of material cost and value added functions: remote village 
dummy has negative coefficients and they are more significant in 1999 than in 1995; 
marketing specialist dummy has positive coefficients in both material cost and value 
added regressions in 1999, and one of them is significant; and skill dummy has positive 
and significant coefficients in both functions in 1999.  Also noteworthy is the positive 
and significant coefficient of average schooling years of employees, which suggests the 
increasing importance of the employment of educated labor.  These findings amply 
support Hypothesis 1 that the quality of products and the incidence of direct marketing 
are positively correlated. 
     In order to test Hypothesis 3 directly, let us now turn to the examination of the 
effects on total value added of m, v, K/L, and the observable characteristics of the 
enterprise and its manager that may affect the unobservable production efficiency, A.15  
The endogenous variables (i.e., v, m, and K/L) are instrumented with Xi as well as the 
current value of initial investment.16  Table 8 reports the results of the two-stage least 
square estimation of equation (2).17  In the first column, v and m are omitted and, 
hence, the coefficients of years of operation and former occupation dummies represent 
their indirect effects through their effects on v, A, and m.  The estimate of the 
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production elasticity with respect to capital is greater than but not significantly different 
from the average capital share of income, which is estimated at 0.47.18  It should be 
noted that factory worker dummy and marketing specialist dummy have positive and 
significant effects on productivity, which is consistent with Hypothesis 3.  It is also 
noteworthy that the variable years of operation has a positive and significant effect. 
     In the second column, the coefficients of the predicted values of ln(v) and ln(m) 
are found to have the expected positive and negative signs, respectively.  In equation 
(2), while ln(v) is supposed to have a unitary coefficient, its estimate is smaller than but 
not significantly different from 1.  The coefficients of years of operation and factory 
worker dummy continue to be positive and significant, whereas that of marketing 
specialist dummy is no longer significant.  Recall that the coefficient of factory worker 
dummy was significant but smaller than that of marketing specialist dummy in the last 
column in Table 7.  In light of these results, we conjecture that experience as a 
marketing specialist contributes to total value added through enhancing the quality of 
products reflected in v, while experience as a factory worker and ongoing experience as 
an operator contribute to total value added mostly through enhancing the production 
efficiency reflected in A.  The former interpretation suggests that higher marketing 
knowledge of enterprise managers leads to stronger and more successful cooperation 
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with urban traders demanding high-quality products. 
    Thus, Table 8 supports Hypothesis 3 that those entrepreneurs experienced in 
factory production and marketing are more successful.  Finally, it must be pointed out 
that there are no significant effects of location variables on production efficiency.  This 
result, together with those shown in Table 7, suggests that the locational advantage of 
the central location is realized only through relatively high value added and material 
costs per piece of products produced there, which are, in turn, closely related to the 
relatively high proportions of direct transactions with outside traders.  This is an 
expected result since high-valued products are sold through direct transactions between 
enterprise managers and outside traders, who usually meet at garment shops located in 
the center of the town and are run by the managers. 
   
V.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
A unique feature of this study was the use of retrospective statistical data on the 
characteristics of enterprise managers and the performance of their enterprises, which 
enabled us to trace the process of the formation of a garment cluster and its subsequent 
development in Jili.  We found that the establishment of a marketplace by the township 
government was particularly important in stimulating the entry of new enterprises in the 
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early stage of development, when the major products were simple and standard.  The 
entrepreneurs in this stage were largely inexperienced in garment production and 
relatively uneducated.  In all likelihood, the barriers to entry to the garment industry 
were low owing to the establishment of the marketplace, where entrepreneurs purchased 
materials and sold their products.  As the quality of products improved, however, the 
role of the marketplace declined and the role of entrepreneurial ability increased.  
Indeed, successful entrepreneurs in this quality-improvement stage, where the 
production and marketing of differentiated, higher-quality products became the key to 
the success in enterprise management, are more educated and experienced than 
entrepreneurs in the earlier stage.  In short, our study strongly indicates the need to 
focus on the changing nature of interactions among the roles of the marketplace, the 
product quality, and the entrepreneurship, in order to gain proper insights into the 
process of industrial development. 
Our study has three important implications for the future study of industrial 
clusters.  First, the role of the marketplace, which has seldom been analyzed 
quantitatively as well as systematically, will have to be taken into account.19  Second, 
due attention should be paid to the changing importance of locations in the process of 
cluster development, i.e., the increasing importance of the center of the industrial town 
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in the product-quality improvement stage, which would strengthen the tendency for 
clustering.  Third, entrepreneurial ability in marketing in the development process of 
industrial clusters needs to be focused on, in order to understand interactions between 
the structure of clusters and the marketing channels with urban and other outside 
markets. 
Needless to say, it is hazardous to draw strong conclusions from a single case 
study.  However, our parallel, ongoing studies on the development of private 
enterprises in Wenzhou City in Zhejiang province and the garment industry in postwar 
Japan provide consistent findings.  It will be a major challenge for economists 
interested in the role of industrial clusters to examine the similarities and dissimilarities 
in the characteristics of industrial clusters across different industries in different 
countries through additional case studies.  
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NOTES 
1. In China the private manufacturing sector has grown more rapidly than the collective 
township-village enterprise sector particularly in the 1990s, not to mention the state 
sector.  According to a recent study by Liu [2000] using the 1995 industrial 
census, for example, the production efficiency of private enterprises was much 
higher than state-owned enterprises and enterprises owned collectively by township 
and village governments.  
2. We agree with Schmitz [1995b, p. 530] that “the relevance of clustering is brought 
into focus most sharply by case studies ….” 
3. This is called “qian dian hou an” in Chinese, meaning “shop in front and housing and 
factory in the back.” 
4. There are a number of empirical studies reporting the positive relationship between 
the quality improvement and the establishment of inter-enterprise long-term 
transactions [Rabellotti, 1995, 1999; Schmitz 1995b, 1999; Tewari, 1999]. 
5. Collective rural enterprises run by the township and village governments are 
generally much larger.  According to Murakami, Liu, and Otsuka [1994], collective 
garment enterprises employing more than 500 workers were not uncommon. 
6. Profit is defined as the value of output minus paid-out costs of current inputs and 
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wage payment to hired workers. 
7. In contrast to the private market channels used by small private enterprises, collective 
rural enterprises relied heavily on state enterprises for marketing, at least until the 
early 1990s [Otsuka, Liu, and Murakami, 1998, chapter 6]. 
8. Value added is defined as the value of production minus material costs, energy and 
water costs, and fees paid to local traders when marketing is contracted out to them. 
9. In our observation, transactions with outside traders are executed primarily in the 
center of Jili town. 
10. In this study, capital input is defined as capital stock times the number of working 
days in the year, whereas labor input is the product of the number of employees and 
the number of working days.  Therefore, capital-labor ratio is equal to the ratio of 
the value of capital stock to the number of employees.     
11.  Thus, the case of Jili seems quite different from the case of the automobile factory 
in Mexico reported by Shaiken [1994], where high productivity is achieved despite 
non-specialization of workers in particular tasks who received off-the-job training.  
12. We did not include material inputs in the production function f, because it can be 
assumed that the quantity of material inputs is proportional to the quantity of output.  
13. Distance ranges from 1km to 6km in the township, 1km to 2km in the neighboring 
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villages, and 7km to 16km in the remote villages. 
14. Since there are only 27 enterprises in the sample for 1990, we used the data only in 
1995 and 1999 for the regression analysis. 
15. Note that as is properly emphasized by Schmitz [1995], it is not possible to identify 
the collective efficiency of the industrial cluster arising from local external 
economies and joint actions from individual enterprise data.   
16. We used the initial investment as a predetermined variable, as it has a significant 
effect on capital-labor ratio.  To obtain real values in the 1999 yuan, we deflated 
initial investment values by the producer price index of the machinery industry 
estimated by Liu [2000].  However, the initial investment has no significant effects 
on m and v. 
17. We deleted location dummies in the first three equations for the purpose of 
identification. 
18. This is obtained by subtracting the average factor share of labor shown in Table 1 
from unity, while assuming competitive equilibrium under constant-returns-to-scale 
production technology.  
19. The role of both local and urban traders in the development of industrial clusters in 
rural areas is well known in Japan.  See, for example, Itoh and Tanimoto [1998]. 
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TABLE 1 
GENERAL CONDITIONS OF SAMPLE ENTERPRISES a  
 
Year 1990 1995 1999 
Production quantity (1,000 pieces) 24 36 71 
Number of employees  8.7 11.1 16.7 
Product price (yuan) 15.1 18.5 16.4 
Value added per piece (yuan)b 4.5 5.2 3.3 
Value added (1,000 yuan) b 114 203 224 
Hourly wage earnings (yuan) c 1.26 1.60 1.79 
Labor share of income d 0.39 0.45 0.53 
Number of observations 27 66 98 
 
Notes:  a. Average per enterprise per year. 
b. Value added = sales – material costs – energy and water costs – marketing fees paid to 
local traders. 
c. Hourly wage earnings = monthly labor costs / (the number of employees) /(average 
working hours per employee).  
d. Labor share = labor costs / value added. 
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TABLE 2 
 
PERCENTAGE COMPOSITION OF MARKETING CHANNELS 
  
Year 1990 1995 1999 
Local Marketplace 44.8 38.7 37.7 
Direct transactions with outside 
traders 
26.3 48.4 60.8 
Local traders and other channels 28.9 12.9 1.5 
 
Note: Average per enterprise by year. 
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TABLE 3 
 
CHANGES IN PRODUCT PRICES BY MARKETING CHANELL a 
 
Year 1990 1995 1999 
Prices at Local Marketplace b     
   Average price  12.3 18.5 13.0 
   Material costs per piece 8.6 13.1 10.5 
   Value added per piece 3.3 5.0 2.2 
  Number of observations 7 10 21 
Prices in direct transactions with outside traders c   
   Average price 15.8 19.9 18.8 
   Material costs per piece 10.5 14.6 14.6 
   Value added per piece 5.0 5.1 3.9 
  Number of observations 4 15 36 
 
Notes: a. Average per enterprise in Chinese yuan. 
b. From the sample of enterprises that sell only at the local marketplace. 
c. From the sample of enterprises directly dealing with outside traders only. 
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TABLE 4 
 
PERFORMANCE OF ENTERPRISES BY LOCATION a 
 
Year 1990 1995 1999 
Proportion of direct transactions with outside traders (%)  
  Township and neighboring villages  32.0 56.9 77.5 
  Remote villages 10.0 26.6 18.9 
Material cost per piece (yuan)    
  Township and neighboring villages  11.2 14.9 14.1 
  Remote villages 8.1 8.9 9.7 
Value added per piece (yuan)    
  Township and neighboring villages  4.9 5.9 3.7 
  Remote villages 3.1 3.2 2.5 
Number of employees     
  Township and neighboring villages  9.6 12.4 19.3 
  Remote villages 6.3 7.5 10.3 
Proportion of migrants in employees (%)   
  Township and neighboring villages  64.2 88.8 93.5 
  Remote villages 22.4 73.1 81.4 
Hourly wage earnings (yuan)    
  Township and neighboring villages  1.3 1.7 1.9 
  Remote villages 1.1 1.3 1.6 
Capital-labor ratio (yuan per person)a   
  Township and neighboring villages  na na 1353 
  Remote villages na na 1097 
Average labor productivity (yuan per working day)b  
  Township and neighboring villages  65.6 84.8 60.2 
  Remote villages 43.5 64.2 49.4 
 
Notes: a. Average per enterprise per year. 
b. Capital-labor ratio = replacement value of equipment / number of employees. 
c. Average labor productivity = value added / (number of workers x operation months x 
average operation days per month). 
 
 
 
 39 
TABLE 5  
 
TIMING OF NEW ENTRY BY PREVIOUS OCCUPATION,  
YEARS OF SCHOOLING, AND TECHNICAL EXPERTISE  
OF ENTERPRISE MANAGER  
 
Year 1980-1990 1991-1995 1996-1999 
Occupation (%)    
 Farmer 51.9 32.5 32.2 
 Factory worker 18.5 32.5 22.6 
 Marketing specialist 3.7 12.5 22.6 
 Other manager and specialist 25.9 22.5 22.6 
 Total 100 100 100 
Years of schooling 7.1 7.4 7.5 
Proportion of new managers with 
sewing and related skills  (%) 
25.9 40.0 45.2 
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TABLE 6 
 
PERFORMANCE OF ENTERPRISES BY PREVIOUS OCCUPATION 
 OF MANAGERS 
 
Year 1995 1999 
Proportion of direct dealing with outside traders(%)  
   Farmer 51.8 58.9 
   Factory worker 39.7 47.6 
   Marketing specialist 60.0 91.5 
   Other manager and specialist  57.5 60.8 
Value added per piece (yuan)   
   Farmer 4.6 3.2 
   Factory worker 4.3 3.2 
   Marketing specialist 10.4 4.2 
   Other specialist or manager  5.4 3.2 
Number of employees   
   Farmer 9.8 14.1 
   Factory worker 10.0 14.6 
   Marketing specialist 16.4 26.3 
   Other manager and specialist  12.8 17.9 
Capital-labor ratio (yuan per person)   
   Farmer na 1282 
   Factory worker na 1173 
   Marketing specialist na 1464 
   Other manager and specialist  na 1287 
Average labor productivity (yuan per working day)  
   Farmer 69.2 52.8 
   Factory worker 78.3 61.9 
   Marketing specialist 115.9 68.0 
   Other manager and specialist  87.0 53.1 
 
Note: Average per enterprise per year. 
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TABLE 7 
 
DETERMINANTS OF DIRECT TRANSACTION RATIO, AND  
MATERIAL COST AND VALUE ADDED PER PIECE  
 
 
Variables 
Direct transaction 
ratio 
(two-limit tobit) 
ln(Material costs 
per piece) 
(OLS) 
Value added per 
piece 
(OLS) 
1995 1999 1995 1999 1995 1999 
Remote village dummy 
-1.11* 
(0.47) 
-1.15** 
(0.32) 
-0.50* 
(0.21) 
-0.63** 
(0.16) 
-0.32 
(0.34) 
-0.52** 
(0.19) 
Neighboring village dummy 
0.02 
(0.37) 
-0.70** 
(0.26) 
-0.02 
(0.17) 
0.13 
(0.14) 
-0.10 
(0.28) 
-0.05 
(0.16) 
ln(Distance)  
0.23 
(0.33) 
-0.08 
(0.23) 
0.04 
(0.15) 
0.25* 
(0.12) 
-0.08 
(0.24) 
0.16 
(0.14) 
ln(years of operation) 
0.31* 
(0.14) 
0.08 
(0.09) 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
0.10* 
(0.05) 
-0.08 
(0.09) 
0.13* 
(0.06) 
Farmer dummy 
0.51 
(0.28) 
0.32 
(0.18) 
0.01 
(0.12) 
0.06 
(0.09) 
-0.06 
(0.19) 
0.16 
(0.10) 
Factory worker dummy 
0.06 
(0.28) 
-0.00 
(0.18) 
0.04 
(0.13) 
0.14 
(0.10) 
-0.14 
(0.21) 
0.20* 
(0.11) 
Marketing specialist dummy 
-0.44 
(0.40) 
0.46* 
(0.23) 
0.10 
(0.17) 
0.07 
(0.12) 
0.31 
(0.29) 
0.32** 
(0.13) 
Skill dummy 
0.28 
(0.22) 
0.37** 
(0.14) 
-0.10 
(0.10) 
0.21** 
(0.07) 
-0.43* 
(0.16) 
0.18* 
(0.09) 
Years of schooling  
0.069* 
(0.035) 
0.044* 
(0.022) 
-0.006 
(0.015) 
-0.001 
(0.011) 
0.003 
(0.025) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Average years of schooling 
of employees 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.06* 
(0.03) 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
Invited technician dummy 
0.06 
(0.26) 
0.24 
(0.17) 
0.08 
(0.12) 
0.27** 
(0.09) 
-0.09 
(0.19) 
0.25* 
(0.10) 
Constant 
-0.77 
(0.71) 
0.69 
(0.55) 
2.34 
(0.31) 
1.84 
(0.27) 
1.59 
(0.51) 
0.07 
(0.32) 
Number of observations 64 98 64 98 64 98 
Adjusted R-squared - - 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.28 
 
Notes:  Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  ** significant at the one percent level, * at 
the five percent level. 
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TABLE 8 
 
2SLS ESTIMATION OF PRODUCTION FUNCTION FOR 1999 
 
 
 
ln(V/L)  
Variables (i) (ii) 
ln(v) 
   (instrumented)  
- 
0.67* 
(0.34) 
ln(m) 
   (instrumented) 
- 
-0.59 
(0.37) 
ln(years of operation) 
0.15* 
(0.06) 
0.13* 
(0.06) 
Farmer dummy 
0.01 
(0.11) 
-0.04 
(0.10) 
Factory worker dummy 
0.25* 
(0.12) 
0.24* 
(0.10) 
Marketing specialist dummy 
0.28* 
(0.14) 
0.14 
(0.14) 
ln(K/L) 
   (instrumented) 
0.55* 
(0.26) 
0.56* 
(0.24) 
Remote village dummy  - - 
Neighboring village dummy - - 
Constant 
-0.28 
(1.88) 
0.43 
(1.70) 
 
Notes:  Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  ** significant at the one percent level, * at 
the five percent level. 
 
